We propose a quantum secret sharing protocol with a set of orthogonal generalized Bell states and one-way local distinguishability. In the proposed protocol, the participants use local projective measurements and one-way classical communication to distinguish among four Bell states, and we combine with the Shamir (t, n)-threshold scheme to realize (t, n)-threshold access structure. Compared to the existing schemes, the practical communication costs are dramatically improved as there is need for one-way classic communication between the two participants in our protocol. In addition, the efficiency in the process of information transmission will also be improved, as the number of communications will be reduced. At last, we demonstrate our protocol to be secure against both eavesdropping and dishonest participants.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many security protocols are designed for two parties, but in real life there are many practical scenarios involving multiparty participation. Therefore, secret sharing is an important research topic in the cryptography. In a secret sharing scheme, there is a dealer who distributes a piece of secret information (called the secret) among a number of participants in such a way that only a set of qualified participants can collaboratively recover the secret (see Fig.1 ). Secret sharing provides a new idea for key management, which reduces the risk of storing secrets and ensures the integrity of secrets. In terms of classic secret sharing, Shamir [1] and Blakley and Robert [2] gave the concept of classical secret sharing scheme respectively, and designed the sharing scheme based on different mathematical principles in 1979. Shamir's algorithm is based on Lagrange difference method, and Blakley's algorithm is based on finite geometry. Both algorithms can implement (t, n)-threshold structure, but secret and shares in their schemes were classical information.
With the in-depth study of quantum computers, such as Shor algorithm, it has been found that classical secret sharing can not meet the needs of information security. Therefore, The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Sedat Akleylek . many researchers have extended the classical scheme to the quantum field [3] - [7] . Subsequently, quantum secret sharing (QSS) has become the remarkable example of quantum advantages. In quantum protocols, the secret of transmission can be classical information [3] or unknown quantum states [4] - [6] . Therefore, the participants need to be composed of three modes: quantum system, quantum communication and classical communication. Generally speaking, quantum communication is used between participants and the dealer, and classical communication is used among all participants. Compared to the classical secret sharing, QSS is more secure due to the excellent properties of quantum theory, such as quantum non-cloning theorem and Heisenberg uncertainty principle.
In 1999, Hillery et al. [3] used three-particle and fourparticle GHZ states to design the first complete QSS scheme. At the same year, Karlsson et al. [7] proposed a QSS protocol using two-particle quantum entanglement and discussed the security of that scheme. In 2004, Xiao et al. [8] generalized the QSS of Hillery et al. into arbitrary multiparty. Since then, quantum secret sharing schemes based on different principles have been proposed such as multiparty-to-multiparty QSS [9] , [10] , circular QSS [11] - [13] , verifiable QSS [14] , [15] , graph-state QSS [16] - [19] , entangled-photon QSS [20] - [22] , single-photon QSS [23] - [27] , weak coherent states [28] , local operations and classical communication (LOCC) [29] - [35] and so on. Moreover, Rahaman and Parker [30] proposed the quantum secret sharing based on local distinguishability and realized the restricted (2, n)-threshold access structure. Based on the properties of LOCC, many schemes are constructed in [31] - [35] . In these schemes, there exist some similarities: (1) they uses the two-way classical communication between two players;
(2) the quantum states in the scheme are n-particle entangled states; (3) the access structure is basically not the standard threshold. These similarities also show the shortcomings of these protocols. For (1), two-way classical communication is more likely to cause information leakage, environmental impact and increased cost of secure communication. For (2), n-particle entangled states are not easy to generate, transmit and store. For (3), although Wang et al. proposed a more secure (t, n)-threshold in [35] , it is difficult to choose the right quantum states to design the corresponding scheme.
In [36] , Singal et al. studied in detail the distinction of Bell states in C 4 ⊗ C 4 based on one-way local operations and classical communication. This is a good tool for constructing quantum secret sharing schemes because this can not only reduce the number and cost of communication, but also make it easier to generate Bell states than n-particle entangled ones. Therefore, in this paper, we propose the quantum secret sharing scheme that uses one-way LOCC to distinguish between four orthogonal Bell states in C 4 ⊗ C 4 . In our protocol, we adopt the data block transmission technique [37] , the decoy-photon technique [38] , [39] and the delayed-measurement technique [40] to assure the security of the transmission. In addition, combined with the Shamir (t, n)-threshold scheme, we realized (t, n)-threshold access structure.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section II, we give some preliminaries. In Section III, we propose the quantum secret sharing scheme. Section IV analyzes the security and compares our scheme with the existing schemes. Finally, the conclusion is given in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we review the one-way local distinguishability problem related to a set of orthogonal symmetric states, i.e., the generalized Bell state.
Firstly, we introduce the definition of the one-way local operations and classical communication. A one-way LOCC measurement is composed of a set of operators M = {A k ⊗ B k,j }, where k A k = I A and j B k,j = I B for every value of k. If we obtain the measurement operator A k ⊗B k,j , we can calculate that our state was prepared as |ϕ j . Hence, we can distinguish our states perfectly if, for every k and i = j,
Suppose that H is a d-dimensional Hilbert space, then a generalized Bell state can be devoted by
where ω = e 2π i d , n, m ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d − 1}, and the symbol ''⊕ d '' means the adder modulo d, i.e., j
are orthogonal bases corresponding to the first subsystem and the second subsystem, respectively. Note that ψ
In order to distinguish quantum states, we know that classical communication is essential. With loss of generality, we can suppose that Alice and Bob share the following two Bell states:
Their goal is to distinguish the above Bell states by only local operations (LO) on their respective qubits, that is, they can not use the classical communication each other. It is assumed that Alice and Bob are far from each other, and they share the known Bell state | ± . Bob first applies I or σ z on his qubit to encode information 0 or 1, respectively. Therefore, the desired state may change to another orthogonal Bell state as
If Alice (alone) is able to distinguish the above pair without any communication from Bob, then she can recover Bob's message as well. Obviously, that's impossible because it will go beyond the speed of light. Hence, if Alice wants to get the information of Bob, she must have the classic communication from Bob. In this paper, we consider the case where classical communication is one-way, that is, only participants with the first particle are allowed to send their measurement results to participants with the second particle by one-way communication.
In 2017, Singal et al. [36] studied all the cases of generalized Bell states in C 4 ⊗ C 4 , and gave the one-way LOCC protocol for their perfect locally distinguishability. Then the following two families of quantum states are given
Theorem 1: [36] Any set of four generalized Bell states in C 4 ⊗ C 4 of the family K 1 or K 2 can be distinguished by one-way LOCC using only projective measurements.
Detailed proof can be found in [36] . It is not difficult to find that the families K 1 and K 2 contain the same sets. Therefore, we give the following lemma.
Lemma 2: For the families K 1 and K 2 , their intersection is represented as follows
and | K | = 10, where a, b, c, d, e, f , g, h ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, a = b = c = d, e = f = g = h and | · | represents the number of elements contained in the set.
Theorem 3: For any set of four generalized Bell states in the family K , Alice can start with a rank-1 projective measurement in the orthonormal basis M 1 or M 2 to distinguish them.
By Theorem 1, it is easy to know that Theorem 3 is true. For example, {|ψ 00 , |ψ 11 , |ψ 22 , |ψ 33 } can be denoted by
where |u 0 , |u 1 , |u 2 , |u 4 ∈ M 2 . Obviously, these four states can be perfectly locally distinguished by either M 1 or M 2 .
In order to design a quantum secret sharing scheme, we list all the states and the projective measurements of the first subsystem in Table 1 . Note that we do not count the repeated sets of quantum states, that is, if the quantum state set appears in K , we require Alice to perform the projective measurement M 1 in the following quantum secret sharing scheme. In addition, we give the following theorem.
Theorem 4: For the corresponding projective measurements, the four quantum states in all groups in Table 1 can be perfectly distinguished by one-way LOCC using only projective measurements.
Proof: For simplicity, we consider only some of these, and the others can be similarly calculated. With loss of generality, we take K 1 and K 257 as examples.
For K 1 = {|ψ 00 , |ψ 11 , |ψ 22 , |ψ 33 }, we can calculate that
Alice measures the first particle with the orthonormal basis M 1 = {|0 , |1 , |2 , |3 } and records the results. Then the measurement results are informed to Bob by one-way classical communication. After that, Bob measures the second subsystem with {|0 , |1 , |2 , |3 } according to the measurement results of Alice. Therefore, these quantum states in K 1 can be perfectly distinguished.
For K 257 = {|ψ 00 , |ψ 10 , |ψ 20 , |ψ 30 }, we can calculate that
where |u 0 , |u 1 , |u 2 , |u 4 ∈ M 2 . Alice uses M 2 to measure the first subsystem and sends measurement results to Bob by one-way classical communication. After that, Bob measures the second subsystem with M 2 according to the measurement results that Alice sent. Therefore, these quantum states in K 257 can be perfectly distinguished. 
III. OUR PROPOSED PROTOCOL
Now we propose our scheme in some phases: Alice is going to share her secret information among n participants, {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n }, such that some of them must collaboratively reconstruct Alice's secret. The flow chart of our scheme is shown in Fig.2 . In this protocol, we adopt some techniques, such as the data block transmission [37] , the decoyphoton technique [38] , [39] and the delayed-measurement technique [40] .
In order to clearly describe the scheme, we first give some marks. K represents the family of all quantum state sets in Table 1 and M represents the family of all orthogonal projective measurement sets in Table 1 . Then K is denoted by
and M is denoted by
A. PREPARATION PHASE
Step 3.1.1 The dealer Alice randomly chooses a set of quantum states in the family K to encode the secret information.
With loss of generality, the set of quantum states to encode information can be denoted as
After Alice determines the set of coding states K i , the corresponding set of projective measurement operators is also determined. We denote that the projective measurement operator set for the first subsystem is M B k = {|u 0 , |u 1 , |u 2 , |u 3 } ∈ M, and the projective measurement operator set of the second particle is
Step 3.1.2 According to Shamir (t, n)-threshold scheme, the dealer Alice can compute n shares {s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s n }. Share s i is represented as a binary string, i.e., s i = (a i1 , a i2 , a i3 , · · · , a im ), where 1 ≤ i ≤ n and a i1 , a i2 , a i3 , · · · , a im ∈ {0, 1}.
In order to improve the security of the scheme, Alice now prepares n arbitrary permutations { 1 , 2 , · · · , n }, and makes use of i to disrupt the order of s i = (a i1 , a i2 , a i3 , · · · , a im ). Therefore, she produces a new sequence Fig.3 ).
Step 3.1.3 According to the b ij ∈ s i (i = 1, 2, · · · , n; j = 1, 2, 3, · · · , m), Alice randomly selects n quantum states from K i and puts them in the corresponding registers R 1 , R 2 , · · · , R n as shown in Fig.4 , where R i (i = 1, 2, · · · , n) stores two particles from different quantum states.
Step 3.1.4 In this step, Alice uses the checking photon technique to guarantee the security of transmission and randomly chooses some checking single photons from
k=0 e πijk 2 |k . After that, she inserts them into each register R i and records the corresponding positions.
B. DISTRIBUTION AND RECONSTRUCTION PHASE
Step 3.2.1 In order to prevent the dishonest participants, Alice randomly sends register R i to P j , where i, j = 1, 2, · · · , n. Note that each participant does not know which participant's particles in the register form entangled states with others.
Step 3.2.2 After confirming that P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n have received their own registers, Alice announces the positions and measuring base of checking photons in each register R i . All participants take some measures to their corresponding checking photons in given bases and resend the results to Alice.
According to all participants' results, Alice can evaluate the error rate. If the error rate is not higher than threshold value, then she will take the next step. Otherwise, she must abort the protocol and start again with a new set of resources.
Step 3.2.3 In the step, Alice asks each participant P j to measure the first particle in their register R i with the projective measurement M B k . Furthermore, according to the command issued by Alice, each participant P j sends the measurement results to the next participant P j specified by Alice via one-way classical communication, where j = j and j, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}.
After P j receives the measurement results of P j , Alice asks P j to measure the second particle in their register R i with the projective measurement M B l .
According to the measurement results, each participant P j can distinguish that the second particle in his hand belongs to which maximally entangled state in K i .
The mapping between classical bit value and these maximally entangled states is fixed and communicated security from Alice to all participants in advance. Since the whole distribution device is annular, all participants will receive a value b ij ∈ s i (i = 1, 2, · · · , n; j = 1, 2, 3, · · · , m) in the secret share of string s i .
Step 3.2.4 Repeat N (N > m) runs for the above steps. To further ensure the security of the scheme, Alice selects the N − m runs and asks all participants to send the measurement results to her. Then, she checks whether the quantum state was the maximally entangled one she sent. If the error rate is not higher than threshold value, then she will take the next step. Otherwise, she must abort the protocol.
Step 3.2.5 Alice publicly announces the information of permutation i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) to the corresponding participants. Moreover, each participant can translate
, a i2 , a i3 , · · · , a im ) according to i . Furthermore, each participant gets a real secret share s i .
Step 3.2.6 According to the reconstruction algorithm of Shamir's scheme, any more than t participants use Lagrange difference method to restore the original secret.
IV. ANALYSIS OF OUR PROPOSED SCHEME A. SECURITY DISCUSSION
In this section, we mainly analyse the security of our scheme against three primary quantum attacks: the intercept-andresend attack, entangle-and-measure attack, and dishonest participant attack.
1) INTERCEPT-AND-RESEND ATTACK
The first strategy for the eavesdropper Eve is the interceptand-resend attack. In this paper, Alice uses the decoy photon technique to check eavesdropper's attacks, which some sample checking single photons are chosen from X = {|0 , |1 , |2 , |3 } or Z = {|J 0 , |J 1 , |J 2 , |J 3 }.
When Alice randomly sends register R i to P j (i, j = 1, 2, · · · , n), Eve can intercept all registers and measure the particles by the X -basis and Z -basis. After that, she sends the fake registers R * 1 , R * 2 , · · · , R * n to the participants. Although
Eve has intercepted all the registers, she does not know the positions of the detected photons in each register. When she measures those photons, she must introduce some errors. In addition, the registers sent by Alice to each participant are random, so Eve does not know how to send fake registers correctly to the specified participant. Assuming that Alice inserts l detecting photons into each register R i , the probability that Eve will successfully measure for the register R i is ( 1 2 ) l . Hence, for all registers, the probability of successful detection is ( 1 2 ) ln , that is, Alice can detect eavesdropping with the probability 1 − ( 1 2 ) ln . Furthermore, when the numbers of n and l get larger, the probability is
Even if Eve knew the positions of detected photons in each register, she does not know which two particles are entangled. Therefore, she cannot distinguish all quantum states correctly, that is, she does not have access to classic information. Moreover, the scheme needs N − m runs to complete the secret share transmission. In this process, the intercept-and-resend attack will certainly increase the error rate. Consequently, Eve's eavesdropping will be detected from the higher error rate. Therefore, such an attack will not succeed.
2) ENTANGLE-AND-MEASURE ATTACK
The second strategy for the eavesdropper Eve is the entangleand-measure attack, that is, she entangles her auxiliary system with particles sent by Alice to obtain the information.
To depict this process, we suppose that Eve performs the unitary transform U E on her particles and the auxiliary ones in the following forms,
where |E is the initial state of Eve's ancillary system; ω = e πi 2 , |e kl (k, l = 0, 1, 2, 3) is the pure auxiliary state determined uniquely by the unitary transform U E , and 0, 1, 2, 3) .
In order to avoid introducing the error rate, Eve has to set: a kl = 0, where k = l and k, l ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Therefore, the (17) and (18) can be simplified as follows:
In addition, Eve has to set 3 k=0 ω k(j−m) a kk |e kk = 0 (m ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, m = j).
Then for any j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, we can get four equations. According to these four equations, we can compute that a 00 |e 00 = a 11 |e 11 = a 22 |e 22 = a 33 |e 33 .
To obtain useful information about the secret, Eve uses the unitary transform U E on the first qubit of |ψ nm = 1 
where ω = e πi 2 and j ⊕ m = (j + m) mod 4. In (23) , it means that Eve has no effect on the encoded quantum states if she wants to eavesdrop without being detected. So the entangle-and-measure attack is unsuccessful.
3) DISHONEST PARTICIPANT ATTACK
For secret sharing schemes, dishonest participants are more likely to have access to useful information than a fourth eavesdropper. For this attack, we consider two cases.
(a) Only one participant is dishonest and the other participants are trusted. Supposing that P 1 is a dishonest participant, we know that P 1 cannot get a corresponding share by the intercept-and-resend attack and the entangle-and-measure attack. Even if P 1 obtains the m-runs measurements of other participants by cheating, he compares his measurements with others to recover the secret share. The successful probability, however, is quite small because Alice has disrupted the order of s i with the random i (i = 1, 2 · · · , n). P 1 doesn't know the true order of s i , so he cannot accurately calculate the share s i .
(b) There are l dishonest participants, where 1 < l < t. In our proposed scheme, even if there are t − 1 dishonest participants, they still cannot restore the original secret because the reconstruction algorithm of our scheme is based on that of the Shamir's scheme which is safe.
For the above cases, those dishonest participants cannot get any information about the secret. Therefore, the participant attack is unsuccessful.
B. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
In this section, we will compare the differences between the proposed scheme and the existing schemes from the basic principle of the scheme, classical communication, quantum state, checking state and the access structure, as shown in Table 2 .
1) CLASSICAL COMMUNICATION MODEL
In Section II, we have introduced that classical communication is necessary when distinguishing several quantum states.
In [30] - [33] , all three schemes use two-way chain classical communication, but in this paper we only make use of oneway loop classical communication, see Fig.5 .
Firstly, we suppose there are n participants to distinguish the quantum states. When quantum state distinction is completed, the number of one-way loop communication in this scheme is n. Hence, we can mark the communication efficiency as η 1 = 1 n . However, when the two-way chain communication model is used to distinguish quantum states in [30] - [33] , the number of communication is 2n − 2, that is, the communication efficiency is η 2 = 1 2n−2 . It is clear that when n ≥ 2, η 1 ≥ η 2 holds. This implies that the oneway loop communication model used in our scheme is more efficient than two-way chain model.
Secondly, the classical communication in the real environment may produce a certain bit error rate. We consider a simple situation in which all participants use the same means of communication and each communication is independent. Suppose the bit error rate of classical communication is ε. The number of communication between each adjacent participant in Fig.5(a) is 2, then the bit error rate will be 2ε. It is not difficult to find that the number of communication between each adjacent participant in our scheme is 1, so the bit error rate will be ε. With the increase of communication times, the bit error rate of our scheme is significantly lower than that of two-way communication.
Therefore, one-way loop classical communication can reduce the noisy influence in the process of information transmission, and thus improve the stability and effectiveness of the information.
In addition, if the cost of communication is considered, the number of communications in our scheme should be less than that of two-way communication, so this can save a lot of communication costs.
2) QUANTUM STATE AND CHECKING STATE
In Rahaman et al.'s scheme [30] , n-qubit GHZ states are used to share secret information. In [31] and [33] , they uses n-qudit GHZ states to encode secret information. In this paper, we only use Bell states in C 4 ⊗ C 4 to encode classical information. For the preparation and storage of quantum states, Bell states in C 4 ⊗ C 4 are easier to prepare than n-qubit GHZ states or n-qudit GHZ states.
Next we give the following example to explore the problem.
Example 1: Suppose there are six participants P = {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 , P 5 , P 6 } in secret sharing scheme.
In [30] , these participants need to be divided into two sets P 1 and P 2 . Let's take P 1 = {P 1 , P 2 } and P 2 = {P 3 , P 4 , P 5 , P 6 } as an example, then Rahaman constructs the following quantum states in order to implement the restricted (2, 6)-threshold access structure.
In [31] , they realized the generalized restricted (2, n)threshold access structure. Hence these six participants can be divided into several sets. Let's take P 1 = {P 1 , P 2 }, P 2 = {P 3 , P 4 } and P 3 = {P 5 , P 6 } as an example, then the generalized restricted (2, 6)-threshold needs to prepare the following quantum states:
In [33] , they realized the restricted (t, n)-threshold access structure, where n participants need to be divided into t − 2 sets. In this example, suppose we need to implement the restricted (4, 6)-threshold, so these six participants can be divided into two sets. For convenience, we also take P 1 = {P 1 , P 2 } and P 2 = {P 3 , P 4 , P 5 , P 6 } as an example. In the restricted (4, 6)-threshold scheme, these quantum states can be denoted by: 
In our scheme, we only use the generalized Bell states in Table 1 . With loss of generality, we can choose the following quantum states:
Compared with (24) , (25) , (26) and (27), it is not difficult to find that the form of quantum states in (27) is the simplest. It is only two particles entangled, and the other quantum states are six-particle entangled states. Under the existing technology, the multi-particle entangled state is more difficult to prepare and store than the two-particle entangled state. For two-particle entangled states, there are already experimental techniques, such as polarization-entangled photon pairs [21] .
From the point of view of resources, our scheme uses the single quantum states to detect eavesdropping, but Rahaman et al.'s and Bai's scheme [30] , [33] utilize GHZ states in (24) and (26) . Comparison of three kinds of quantum states, obviously, it is easier to make a single quantum state than GHZ, and the cost will be lower.
3) ACCESS STRUCTURE
Rahaman and Parker [30] realized the restricted (2, n)-threshold, which is not a standard (2, n)-threshold scheme. In [31] and [33] , they realized the standard (2, n)-threshold scheme, the generalized restricted (2, n)-threshold and the restricted (t, n)-threshold. For these restricted access structure, all participants need to be divided into several sets, and then one or more participants from each set are selected to form the authorized set, so these are not standard threshold schemes. In this paper, we realize standard (t, n)-threshold in combination with Shamir's scheme. (2, 6) , (c) (2, 6) . Because each participant has equal rights and an equal share in the threshold protocol, the management of the key is more secure. Therefore, this scheme is very meaningful.
In order to better illustrate the problem of access structure, we give the following example. Example 2: In example 1, we have given the quantum states required by each scheme, so the corresponding access structures are given in this example.
The restricted (2, 6)-threshold access structure can be denoted by: (R) (2,6) = {P 1 P 3 , P 1 P 4 , P 1 P 5 , P 1 P 6 , P 2 P 3 , P 2 P 4 , P 2 P 5 , P 2 P 6 }. (28) By using the method of graph, (R) (2, 6) can be represented as a complete bipartite graph in Fig.6(a) .
The generalized restricted (2, 6)-threshold access structure can be denoted by: (B) (2,6) = {P 1 P 3 , P 1 P 4 , P 1 P 5 , P 1 P 6 , P 2 P 3 , P 2 P 4 , P 2 P 5 , P 2 P 6 , P 3 P 5 , P 3 P 6 , P 4 P 5 , P 4 P 6 }. (29) (B) (2, 6) can be represented as a complete triplet graph in Fig.6(b) . In addition, they can also realize a standard (2, 6)-threshold scheme using the method of [31] , which corresponds to a complete graph as shown in Fig.6(c) .
The restricted (4, 6)-threshold access structure (see Fig.7 ) can be denoted by: (B) (4,6) = {P 1 P 2 P 3 P 4 , P 1 P 2 P 3 P 5 , P 1 P 2 P 3 P 6 , P 1 P 2 P 4 P 5 , P 1 P 2 P 4 P 6 , P 1 P 2 P 5 P 6 }. (30) Obviously, the above (R) (2, 6) ,
(2,6) and (B) (4, 6) are not standard threshold structures.
In this paper, we can implement the standard (t, 6)-threshold access structure according to the different settings of Shamir's scheme, where 1 < t ≤ 6. When t = 4, we can realize the standard (4, 6)-threshold access structure as follows: (4, 6) = {P 1 P 2 P 3 P 4 , P 1 P 2 P 3 P 5 , P 1 P 2 P 3 P 6 , P 1 P 2 P 4 P 5 , P 1 P 2 P 4 P 6 , P 1 P 2 P 5 P 6 , P 1 P 3 P 4 P 5 , P 1 P 3 P 4 P 6 , P 1 P 3 P 5 P 6 , P 1 P 4 P 5 P 6 , P 2 P 3 P 4 P 5 , P 2 P 3 P 4 P 6 , P 2 P 3 P 5 P 6 , P 2 P 4 P 5 P 6 , P 3 P 4 P 5 P 6 }.
For this access structure, we can understand that each authorized set is a quadrangle in Fig.6(c) . Therefore, when there are n participants, the standard (t, n)-threshold access structure can be implemented in this paper, while the restricted (t, n)-threshold can only be implemented in [33] . In addition, our standard (t, n)-threshold access structure can contain more authorized sets than restricted (t, n)-threshold. In other words, the graph of the restricted threshold is the subgraph of the corresponding graph of the standard threshold.
Finally, we compare this scheme with Shamir's scheme. The process of Shamir's scheme is classical transmission, and it is more vulnerable to attack by eavesdropper. In the classical transmission process, if the information is eavesdropped, it can not be detected by the participants and the distributor. However, when using quantum means, participants and the distributor can work together to detect eavesdroppers. Therefore, in this paper, a more secure scheme is constructed by combining quantum means. Hence, it means that our scheme is more secure than Shamir's scheme.
V. CONCLUSION
We have proposed here a quantum secret sharing scheme using a set of orthogonal generalized Bell states in C 4 ⊗C 4 and local distinguishability. In the proposed protocol the participants use one-way loop classical communication and local projective measurements to distinguish between the orthogonal states. Combined with the classical Shamir (t, n)-threshold scheme, we presented (t, n)-threshold quantum scheme. Comparing the existing schemes with ours, we note that the existing schemes are not standard threshold access structure while ours is standard (t, n)-threshold access structure. In other words, the graph of the restricted threshold is the subgraph of the corresponding graph of the standard threshold. In addition, we only make use of one-way loop classical communication in our scheme. It can reduce the noisy influence for information transmission and the number of communications, and save the corresponding communication costs. Moreover, we showed that our protocol is secure against the intercept-and-resend attack, entangle-andmeasure attack and dishonest participant attack. Table 2 offers a summary comparison of these schemes.
